Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Department of Computer Science


CSCI 4963/6963: Internet Economics

Spring 2012

ANNOUNCEMENTS

OVERVIEW

The Internet has transformed how people interact with each other, lowering the cost of communication, and enabling us to rapidly both discover and pass on new information. This transformation has had major impacts in how we conduct market transactions (think of eBay, Orbitz, or Amazon), how we maintain our social personae (Facebook, Twitter), and how we accumulate and produce knowledge for consumption (Wikipedia, Yelp). This course will cover theoretical foundations of e-commerce and social networks, as well as focusing on practical aspects of understanding how the design of online venues affects the interactions of participants and the success of the venue.

STAFF

Instructor: Sanmay Das
Office: Lally 302
Phone: x2782
Office hours: Thursdays from 3:30-5:00 PM, and by appointment.

TA: Yuezhang (George) Xiao (xiaoy3 at rpi dot edu)
Office hours: Tuesdays 2-3:30 in Amos Eaton 217

POLICIES

Detailed policies are in the official syllabus. However, a couple of things are worth stressing. This will be taught as a graduate / upper level undergraduate class. That means (especially after the first few weeks) that I will often expect you to have done the reading in advance, and you should come to class prepared to participate. That means you need to both attend class regularly, and participate in class discussions. I consider these essential parts of this class, and will grade accordingly.

TEXTBOOKS

There are two textbooks for this class. They will be supplemented with readings from the academic literature.

PREREQUISITES

I expect some mathematical maturity. Officially, you should previously have taken at least one 4000-level or higher class in Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, Statistics, or Economics. Also, you should have exposure to algorithms, at least at the level of CSCI 2300. If you are not comfortable with calculus and probability, you may have a hard time in this class.

LECTURES

Lectures will be on Mondays and Thursdays from 2:00PM to approximately 3:30PM in Low 3039.
Date Topics Readings Extras
Jan 23 Introduction. Course policies. Course overview. Some interesting problems. Foreword to NRTV, Chapter 1 of EK.
Jan 26 Intro to Game Theory: Example games. EK 6.1-6.6. NRTV 1.1-1.3
Jan 30 Game Theory: Basic solution concepts: dominant strategy solutions and Nash equilibria. Same as above.
Feb 2 Game Theory: Iterated dominance, Mixed equilibria, Correlated equilibria. Same as above.
Feb 6 No class.
Feb 9 Subgame perfect equilibrium. Auctions. EK Chapter 9.
Feb 13 Auctions, contd. EK Chapter 9.
Feb 16 Yet more on Auctions. EK Chapter 9. Colloquium of interest
Feb 20 No class. President's Day.
Feb 23 Social Choice. Condorcet's paradox and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. EK Chapter 23; NRTV Sections 9.1, 9.2. Colloquium of interest
Feb 27 Strategic agenda setting. Different voting rules (Plurality / Borda / Runoffs). EK Chaper 23; NRTV 9.2.
Mar 1 Single-peaked preferences. Manipulability. Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. EK Chapter 23; NRTV 9.2.
Mar 5 Money. Direct-revelation mechanisms and VCG. NRTV 9.3
Mar 8 The Clarke Pivot Rule. Examples of VCG Mechanisms. NRTV 9.3
Mar 19 More on VCG Mechanisms. Public goods games. Sponsored search: GSP vs. VCG. NRTV 9.3.
Intro and Sections 1 and 2 of [EOS 07]
Mar 22 Markets and information. EK 22.1-22.6
Mar 26 Prediction markets and the logarithmic market scoring rule. This blog post
[Hanson 03]
Mar 29 Midterm Colloquium of interest
Apr 2 Prediction market trading games NRTV Chapter 26.
Apr 5 Information aggregation in markets.
Apr 9 Matching.
Apr 12 Social networks I
Apr 16 Social networks II
Apr 19 Social networks III
Apr 23
Apr 26 Colloquium of interest
Apr 30 Final game + in-class test
May 3 Project presentations I
May 7 Project Presentations II. Final projects due.