CSE 516A: Homework 1

Due: February 23, 2018, by 10:00 PM

Submission instructions:

• Sign up for the course on Gradescope (https://gradescope.com) using entry code 9RW2PG.
• For tutorials on submitting through Gradescope, see http://gradescope-static-assets.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/help/submitting_hw_guide.pdf (PDF) or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMPoby5g_nE (video).
• Your homework can be typed or handwritten and scanned in, or a combination.
• There is no need to submit your code, but we may ask you to email us your code, and if you do not then you will not receive any credit.

Note: Please keep in mind the collaboration policy as specified in the course syllabus. If you discuss questions with others you must write their names on your submission, and if you use any outside resources you must reference them. Note that several of the questions are quite open-ended. You will be graded in part on the quality of your analysis and in part on the quality of your writeup, so please write your answers up carefully. There are five questions on three pages.

1. (60 points) The Assignment Problem: In this problem you will explore the properties of the assignment problem and compare two different ways of solving it. We have broken it up into discrete tasks that build on each other.

   (a) (20 points) Implementation: Implement the auction algorithm in the language of your choice, using a representation that you deem appropriate. Also implement a general method for encoding assignment problems as linear programs using the linear programming modeling language of your choice (we recommend GLPK). Test these on small instances to make sure that you get correct answers. Once you’re sure that your algorithms are working, solve the following instance of the assignment problem with ten agents and ten objects (agents are rows, objects are columns):

   $$\begin{array}{cccccccccccc}
01 & 02 & 03 & 04 & 05 & 06 & 07 & 08 & 09 & 10 \\
A1 & 89 & 42 & 0 & 2 & 24 & 20 & 40 & 37 & 30 & 77 \\
A2 & 66 & 75 & 9 & 59 & 69 & 66 & 52 & 14 & 85 & 36 \\
A3 & 82 & 68 & 0 & 81 & 36 & 25 & 48 & 53 & 11 & 68 \\
A4 & 6 & 96 & 82 & 53 & 17 & 70 & 26 & 12 & 91 & 82 \\
A5 & 34 & 86 & 22 & 18 & 66 & 73 & 82 & 88 & 18 & 36 \\
A6 & 90 & 43 & 43 & 93 & 80 & 96 & 12 & 28 & 74 & 93 \\
A7 & 19 & 75 & 30 & 48 & 31 & 76 & 84 & 29 & 20 & 15 \\
\end{array}$$
Report the actual assignment and the total value of that assignment.

(b) (20 points) **Random problems and assignment values:** Now implement a way of generating a random assignment problem given two parameters, \( n \) and \( M \), where \( n \) is the number of agents (there should be an equal number of objects), and the value of each assignment is an integer sampled uniformly at random between 0 and \( M - 1 \) (or 1 and \( M \) if you prefer). You should figure out a way to feed this problem to both the auction algorithm solver and the LP solver (if you are using GLPK, the best way to do this is to generate a separate data file, while keeping the model file to specify the common parts of the model). Now, using either solution technique, compute the per-agent average value of assignments as you increase \( n \), in powers of 2, from 2 to 256, setting \( M \) to 100. Average at least 1000 runs for each case of \( n \). Plot the results and include this plot in your writeup. Explain why you see the pattern you see, backing up your claim with any specific evidence that you may want to gather from the instances you generate or the execution of your code.

(c) (20 points) **Timing:** Now, holding the number of agents constant at 256, change \( M \), this time going up in orders of 10, from 10 to 100 to 1000 and all the way up to \( 10^7 \). Solve each generated instance using both the auction algorithm approach and the linear programming approach, keeping track of how long each solver takes on average to solve an instance as a function of \( M \). You should run the code for at least 100 instances for any particular \( M \) to get a stable estimate. Plot the results for each of the two approaches. Why do you see the results you see? Are they what you expected from the worst case bounds on time discussed in class? Again, you should back up your claims with any specific evidence you deem appropriate from the instances you generate or the execution of your code.

2. (5 points) **Find the matches** Consider a matching market with three men and three women with the following true preferences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 2 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Write down all the stable matchings. How would you characterize them in terms of which side of the market they are better for?

3. (10 points) **Different objectives in stable matching:** Consider a standard stable matching problem with complete preference lists for both men and women. I want to find the stable matching that minimizes the average rank in the preference list of each agent’s assigned partner. For example, if there are three men and three women and a stable matching assigns partners ranked 1, 2, and 2 (in their own preference lists) to the three men, and 1, 3, and 3 to the three women, then the average rank is 2. Write down a linear program (using the same conventions as the basic stable matching LP discussed in lecture) for achieving this objective. (What you write down can be an integer program, actually, but the resulting LP relaxation will be guaranteed to have an integral solution as discussed in class).
4. (10 points) **Manipulation through permutation:** Consider a matching market with three men and three women with the following true preferences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 1 3</td>
<td>2 1 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>3 1 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Suppose the mechanism is Gale-Shapley with men proposing and that all agents must submit complete preference lists. If the agents are all truthful in the preferences they submit, what matching will results? Is there a woman who can misrepresent her preferences and end up with a more preferred partner, assuming others are truthful? If so, which one, what preferences should she submit, and what will the resulting matching be? If not, why not?

5. (15 points) **Matching or assignment with ties** Suppose we have a house assignment problem where agents all start off without endowments. Now, the houses can have priorities (which we will treat like preferences) over the agents (for example, public housing may be allocated based on predefined criteria). There may be ties in the priorities the houses have over agents. First, consider the agent-proposing Gale Shapley algorithm, with the extension that a house will dump someone it is engaged to if it gets a proposal from an agent for which it has either strictly higher or equal priority. Consider the following preferences (a denotes an agent and h a house). 

- $a_1$ ranks $h_2 \succ h_1 \succ h_3$. $a_2$ and $h_3$ both rank $h_1 \succ h_2 \succ h_3$. $h_1$ has the same priorities for each agent $a_1 \sim a_2 \sim a_3$, $h_2$’s ranking is $a_2 \succ a_1 \succ a_3$, and $h_3$’s is $a_3 \succ a_1 \succ a_2$.

Show that the agent-proposing Gale Shapley algorithm may lead to an outcome that is not agent-optimal (you can choose the order of proposals).

Second, show that the outcome is weakly stable, in the sense that there is no pair that strictly prefers each other over their assigned matches.

Third, suppose you use a minor variant of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm in which both agents and houses are nodes on the graph, with each pointing to its most preferred choice (ties are broken uniformly at random). Show, in the above example, that this variant of TTC cannot lead to an outcome that is not agent-optimal.