

First-order logic

Chapter 7, AIMA2e Chapter 8

Outline

- ◇ Why FOL?
- ◇ Syntax and semantics of FOL
- ◇ Fun with sentences
- ◇ Wumpus world in FOL

Pros and cons of propositional logic

- 😊 Propositional logic is *declarative*: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- 😊 Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information (unlike most data structures and databases)
- 😊 Propositional logic is *compositional*:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$
- 😊 Meaning in propositional logic is *context-independent* (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- 😞 Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”
except by writing one sentence for each square

3

First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains *facts*, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- **Objects**: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
- **Relations**: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . . , brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
- **Functions**: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, beginning of . . .

4

Logics in general

Language	Ontological Commitment	Epistemological Commitment
Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
Probability theory	facts	degree of belief $\in [0, 1]$
Fuzzy logic	degree of truth $\in [0, 1]$	known interval value

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants *KingJohn, 2, UCB, ...*

Predicates *Brother, >, ...*

Functions *Sqrt, LeftLegOf, ...*

Variables *x, y, a, b, ...*

Connectives $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$

Equality =

Quantifiers $\forall \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or $term_1 = term_2$

Term = $function(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$
> $(Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)),$
 $Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$\neg S, S_1 \wedge S_2, S_1 \vee S_2, S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$
>(1, 2) \vee \leq (1, 2)
>(1, 2) \wedge \neg >(1, 2)

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**

Model contains ≥ 1 objects (**domain elements**) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for

constant symbols \rightarrow objects


predicate symbols \rightarrow relations

function symbols \rightarrow functional relations

An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$ is true iff the **objects** referred to by $term_1, \dots, term_n$ are in the **relation** referred to by $predicate$

9

Models for FOL: Example



10

Models for FOL: Lots!

We *can* enumerate the models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞

For each k -ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary

For each possible k -ary relation on n objects

For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary

For each choice of referent for C from n objects . . .

Computing entailment by enumerating models is not going to be easy!

Universal quantification

\forall *< variables >* *< sentence >*

Everyone at GMU is smart:

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{GMU}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

$\forall x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being each possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the **conjunction** of **instantiations** of P

$\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{GMU}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn})$

$\wedge \text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{GMU}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Richard})$

$\wedge \text{At}(\text{Mason}, \text{GMU}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Mason})$

$\wedge \dots$

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall

Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{GMU}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

means “Everyone is at GMU and everyone is smart”

Existential quantification

\exists *< variables >* *< sentence >*

Someone at Madison is smart:

$$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Madison}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

$\exists x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being *some* possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the **disjunction** of **instantiations** of P

$$\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Madison}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn})$$

$$\vee \text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Madison}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Richard})$$

$$\vee \text{At}(\text{Madison}, \text{Madison}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Madison})$$

$$\vee \dots$$

Another common mistake to avoid

Typically, \wedge is the main connective with \exists

Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Madison}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Madison!

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$ (why??)

$\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$ (why??)

$\exists x \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$

“Sibling” is symmetric

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Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$$

“Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

Fun with sentences

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“Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x, y \text{ FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \\ \exists p, ps \text{ Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y) \end{aligned}$$

Equality

$term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation

if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

E.g., $1 = 2$ and $\forall x \times (\text{Sqrt}(x), \text{Sqrt}(x)) = x$ are satisfiable

$2 = 2$ is valid

E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \\ \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)] \end{aligned}$$

Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:

$Tell(KB, Percept([Smell, Breeze, None], 5))$

$Ask(KB, \exists a \text{ Action}(a, 5))$

I.e., does the KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?

Answer: *Yes*, $\{a/Shoot\}$ ← substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence S and a substitution σ ,

$S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S ; e.g.,

$S = Smarter(x, y)$

$\sigma = \{x/Hillary, y/Bill\}$

$S\sigma = Smarter(Hillary, Bill)$

$Ask(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

“Perception”

$\forall b, g, t \text{ Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$

$\forall s, b, t \text{ Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex: $\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

$Holding(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed

⇒ keeping track of change is essential

Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$$\forall x, t \text{ At}(\text{Agent}, x, t) \wedge \text{Smelt}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Smelly}(x)$$

$$\forall x, t \text{ At}(\text{Agent}, x, t) \wedge \text{Breeze}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(x)$$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect

$$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)$$

Causal rule—infer effect from cause

$$\forall x, y \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(y)$$

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:

$$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)]$$

Keeping track of change

Facts hold in **situations**, rather than eternally

E.g., *Holding(Gold, Now)* rather than just *Holding(Gold)*


Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL:

Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate

E.g., *Now* in *Holding(Gold, Now)* denotes a situation

Situations are connected by the *Result* function

Result(a, s) is the situation that results from doing *a* in *s*



Describing actions I

“Effect” axiom—describe changes due to action

$$\forall s \text{ AtGold}(s) \Rightarrow \text{Holding}(\text{Gold}, \text{Result}(\text{Grab}, s))$$

“Frame” axiom—describe **non-changes** due to action

$$\forall s \text{ HaveArrow}(s) \Rightarrow \text{HaveArrow}(\text{Result}(\text{Grab}, s))$$

Frame problem: find an elegant way to handle non-change

- (a) representation—avoid frame axioms
- (b) inference—avoid repeated “copy-overs” to keep track of state

Qualification problem: true descriptions of real actions require endless caveats—what if gold is slippery or nailed down or . . .

Ramification problem: real actions have many secondary consequences—what about the dust on the gold, wear and tear on gloves, . . .

Describing actions II

Successor-state axioms solve the representational frame problem

Each axiom is “about” a **predicate** (not an action per se):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{P true afterwards} &\Leftrightarrow [\text{an action made P true} \\ &\vee \text{ P true already and no action made P false}] \end{aligned}$$

For holding the gold:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall a, s \text{ Holding}(\text{Gold}, \text{Result}(a, s)) &\Leftrightarrow \\ &[(a = \text{Grab} \wedge \text{AtGold}(s)) \\ &\vee (\text{Holding}(\text{Gold}, s) \wedge a \neq \text{Release})] \end{aligned}$$

Making plans

Initial condition in KB:

$At(Agent, [1, 1], S_0)$

$At(Gold, [1, 2], S_0)$

Query: $Ask(KB, \exists s \text{ Holding}(Gold, s))$

i.e., in what situation will I be holding the gold?

Answer: $\{s / \text{Result}(Grab, \text{Result}(Forward, S_0))\}$

i.e., go forward and then grab the gold

This assumes that the agent is interested in plans starting at S_0 and that S_0 is the only situation described in the KB

29

Making plans: A better way

Represent **plans** as action sequences $[a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n]$

$PlanResult(p, s)$ is the result of executing p in s

Then the query $Ask(KB, \exists p \text{ Holding}(Gold, PlanResult(p, S_0)))$

has the solution $\{p / [Forward, Grab]\}$

Definition of $PlanResult$ in terms of $Result$:

$\forall s \text{ PlanResult}([], s) = s$

$\forall a, p, s \text{ PlanResult}([a|p], s) = \text{Result}(a, \text{PlanResult}(p, s))$

Planning systems are special-purpose reasoners designed to do this type of inference more efficiently than a general-purpose reasoner

30

Summary

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Situation calculus:

- conventions for describing actions and change in FOL
- can formulate planning as inference on a situation calculus KB